

Research Article

CHANGES IN RECORDED CRIME ACROSS MILITARY DEPLOYMENT PHASES IN HAVANA, WINDHOEK (2017–2022)

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Abstract

This study evaluates whether the joint deployment of the Namibian Defence Force with the Namibian Police Force and the Windhoek City Police under Operation Hornkranz and Operation Kalahari Desert produced measurable and durable changes in reported crime in the Havana Informal Settlement of Windhoek, Namibia, over the 2017–2022 observation window. The study used administrative crime records from the Namibian Police Force Wanaheda station and the Windhoek City Police, segmented into seven offence categories across three consecutive epochs: pre-deployment, active deployment, and post-deployment. Analysis applied interrupted time-series logic supported by one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance, the Friedman non-parametric test, and Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons, with normality and sphericity pre-tests governing test choice. The deployment produced a statistically significant in-window decline in total recorded crime, followed by a sharp post-withdrawal rebound, yielding a statistically non-significant net change across the full window. Reductions were largest and most sustained for weapons and firearms offences, while regulatory offences inflated under expanded enforcement. The trajectory is consistent with transient-guardianship, rather than structural, crime prevention. Military deployments of this type deliver tactical deterrence rather than durable safety. Enduring gains require civilian-specific rules of engagement, codified exit strategies, independent oversight, and parallel investment in civilian-policing capacity. This is the first settlement-level administrative-statistical evaluation of military-supported urban crime prevention in Namibia, providing a

replicable analytic template for similar informal-settlement contexts in the Southern African Development Community.

Keywords: military intervention; crime statistics; interrupted time-series; informal settlements; Routine Activity Theory; Namibia.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

The militarisation of urban policing has become a defining governance response of the twenty-first century, particularly in states where resource-constrained civilian agencies turn to armed forces to manage crime within rapidly expanding informal urban settlements (Brooks, 2020; Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019). This trend concentrates where informal urbanisation has outpaced formal policing capacity, producing recurring patterns of bounded deployment and contested civilian authority (Nielsen, 2012). Across the Southern African Development Community, policing scholarship documents the spatial concentration of crime within informal settlements, yet settlement-level empirical evaluation of what happens when armed forces operate in civilian spaces remains scarce.

Internationally, the evidence base on military deployment in domestic crime-prevention roles is instructive but cautionary. Comparative reviews of Latin American militarisation show that high-visibility deployments typically produce short-term reductions in violence that do not persist after withdrawal, and may erode civilian institutional capacity in the longer term (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019). Experimental evaluations of militarised patrols in Colombian cities report improved citizen perceptions of safety alongside null or adverse objective crime effects. Time-series work on Brazilian military interventions documents the displacement of criminal activity into adjacent peripheries once saturation patrols are withdrawn, while South African analysis of the Cape Flats deployment records short-term homicide reductions that do not persist across the full deployment window. Review-level evidence on place-based policing similarly indicates that focused, high-visibility patrols can suppress offending in targeted micro-places, but that effects decay when guardianship is removed (Braga et al., 2012).

The theoretical lens most frequently applied to these patterns is Routine Activity Theory, which holds that criminal events arise from the convergence of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian in space and time (Braga et al., 2012; Cohen, 2010). Within this framework, a military deployment functions as a transient guardian:

it raises the perceived risk of apprehension within the deployment envelope, but it does not alter the underlying opportunity structure; when the guardian withdraws, the offender–target convergence resumes (Braga et al., 2012; Cohen, 2010). Civil-military relations scholarship adds a second layer of prediction: the legitimacy and durability of such deployments are conditional on the boundedness of military authority, statutory mandate, civilian oversight, codified rules of engagement, and post-operation accountability (Brooks, 2008, 2020; Nielsen, 2012). Procedural-justice research further specifies that public acceptance of coercive state presence is mediated by the perceived fairness of encounters, independently of any measured crime reduction (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Hough et al., 2010; Trinkner et al., 2018). Together, these traditions imply that the tactical crime outcomes of a deployment must be evaluated separately from its durability and legitimacy outcomes.

Namibia presents a distinctive empirical case. Havana, an informal settlement of approximately 50,000 residents on the north-western periphery of Windhoek, has experienced structural pressures including high shack-occupancy tenure, infrastructural deficits, and persistent property crime, pressures that prompted the government to deploy the Namibian Defence Force alongside the Namibian Police Force and the Windhoek City Police under Operation Hornkranz (commenced 22 December 2018) and Operation Kalahari Desert (intensified from May 2019). Although national crime trajectories are monitored administratively, no settlement-level evaluation of the recorded-crime consequences of these operations has been published. This absence of empirical resolution leaves policy-makers without evidence-grounded guidance on whether recurrent deployments produce durable crime suppression or transient displacement.

The present article addresses that gap for the first of the study's four objectives: to measure changes in reported crime rates in the Havana Informal Settlement by comparing police crime statistics before, during, and after military intervention over the period 2017–2022. Three specific questions structure the analysis. First, did the joint deployment produce a measurable change in total recorded crime? Second, did any change persist after withdrawal, or did crime rebound toward baseline? Third, did the pattern vary across offence categories? The aim of the article is to report, analyse, and interpret the administrative-statistical evidence for this quantitative objective; the perception, legal-institutional, and sustainability dimensions of the broader study are reported separately. The remainder of the article proceeds as follows:

Section 2 specifies the methodology, including ethical considerations; Section 3 presents the results; Section 4 concludes with discussion, limitations, and practical implications.

Methodology

Research Design

The article reports the quantitative strand of a convergent parallel mixed-methods study of the Havana Informal Settlement. For this objective, the design is an interrupted time-series analysis of administrative crime records spanning a 64-month observational window, segmented into three intervention epochs: the pre-deployment baseline (January 2017 – December 2018), the active deployment epoch of Operation Hornkranz and Operation Kalahari Desert (December 2018 – March 2020), and the post-deployment observation window (March 2020 – March 2022). The interrupted time-series structure permits trend-shock-trend decomposition, with the deployment treated as an exogenous shock whose crime-suppression effect is estimated against baseline-trend extrapolation.

Study Location and Period

The study was located in Havana, an informal settlement on the north-western periphery of Windhoek, Namibia, within the Samora Machel and Moses //Garob constituencies. Operation Hornkranz commenced on 22 December 2018 and Operation Kalahari Desert intensified from May 2019; the active deployment epoch closed in March 2020, defining the three analysis windows above. The full observation window therefore spans January 2017 to March 2022, giving 24 baseline months, 15 active-deployment months, and 24 post-deployment months.

Data Source and Measures

The outcome data comprise de-identified administrative crime statistics for Havana obtained from the Namibian Police Force and the Windhoek City Police, extracted through a standardised Crime Statistics Collection Template capturing monthly counts for the 64-month window. Offences were classified into seven predetermined categories consistent with the Windhoek City Police administrative framework: crimes against the person; property crimes; white-collar and economic crimes; weapons and firearms offences; drug-related offences; public-order and administration-of-justice offences; and regulatory and statutory offences. Within each category, absolute frequencies and percentage changes between epochs were calculated; the rate denominator was anchored to the Khomas Region population per the

national statistical-agency enumeration so that rates could be expressed per 100,000 population where required.

Population and Sample

For the quantitative objective, the analytical population was the complete set of administrative crime records for the settlement across the observation window; no sampling was required for the administrative strand, which constituted a full enumeration. The broader study additionally surveyed 356 resident households drawn from the approximately 50,000 adult residents of Havana, the sample size derived using Yamane's formula at the 95 per cent confidence level with a five per cent marginal error and recruited through multi-stage cluster sampling stratified across the Samora Machel and Moses //Garob constituencies, and conducted 41 semi-structured key-informant interviews across seven institutional strata. These perception and institutional strands inform the interpretation of the administrative findings in Section 4 but are reported in full in companion articles.

Analytical Strategy

For each crime category, descriptive statistics (absolute frequency, percentage change, mean, standard deviation, and variance where applicable) were computed across the three epochs. Inferential statistics were applied where methodological assumptions permitted. Shapiro–Wilk tests assessed normality and Mauchly's tests assessed sphericity prior to any parametric test; where sphericity was violated, Greenhouse–Geisser corrections were applied. One-way repeated-measures analysis of variance was used for within-subjects comparisons across the three epochs, with partial eta-squared (η^2) as the effect-size estimate. The Friedman non-parametric repeated-measures test was used where distributional assumptions were violated or sample sizes were small. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons distinguished between epoch transitions (before-to-during, during-to-after, before-to-after). The aggregate analysis was supported by an interrupted time-series specification with Markov-dependent Monte Carlo approximation of deployment-window suppression relative to baseline-trend extrapolation, with an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for non-stationarity and a placebo-window check in the 18–24-month pre-deployment segment. Three working hypotheses were pre-registered: H_1 , that total reported crime declined by at least 30 per cent during deployment; H_2 , that the sustainability gap (post-deployment rebound above the pre-deployment baseline) would be at least 10 per cent; and H_3 , that the deployment-window suppression to post-deployment rebound ratio would be below 1.0. Analyses were conducted

using licensed statistical software, with the administrative dataset checked for reliability flags during extraction.

Ethical Considerations

This study received ethical approval from the Africa Research University Ethics Committee (Reference No. ARU/2025/06/012). Institutional authorisation was additionally secured from the Office of the Inspector General of the Namibian Police Force and the Office of the Chief of the Windhoek City Police, which granted access to the administrative crime statistics; constituency offices covering the settlement were informed of the research. Written informed consent was obtained from all human participants in the broader study; consent was verbal-plus-written for resident participants and included explicit audio-recording consent for interview participants. No consent was required for the administrative data because the records are aggregate, de-identified statistics. Confidentiality was maintained through participant-identifier coding, removal of identifying details from all research records, restricted access to raw data, and a seven-year data-destruction protocol. This article reports only aggregate administrative statistics and contains no individual-level identifying information.

Results

Aggregate Trajectory of Total Reported Crime

The 64-month administrative dataset recorded 7,513 incidents across the seven offence categories, distributed as 2,918 during the pre-deployment baseline, 1,908 during the active deployment epoch, and 2,687 during the post-deployment window. Total reported crime declined by 34.6 per cent during the deployment epoch and rebounded by 40.8 per cent after withdrawal, yielding a net before-to-after change of -7.9 per cent (a reduction of 231 incidents) that was statistically non-significant. The aggregate series had a mean of 2,504.33, a standard deviation of 532.72, and a variance of 283,786.33, reflecting the pronounced dip-and-rebound dispersion.

Table 1: Total Reported Crimes by Deployment Phase, Havana (2017–2022)

Period	Total Reported Crimes	Percentage Change
Before Intervention (Jan 2017 – Dec 2018)	2,918	Baseline
During Intervention (Dec 2018 – Mar 2020)	1,908	-34.6%

After Intervention (Mar 2020 – Mar 2022)	2,687	40.80%
Net Before → After	–231	–7.9% (non-significant)

The Friedman non-parametric repeated-measures test confirmed a statistically significant difference in the distribution of crime across the three epochs ($\chi^2 = 12.29$, $df = 2$, $p = 0.002$). A complementary one-way ANOVA on the aggregated category-level data produced $F = 0.26$, $p = 0.775$, which was not statistically significant; given the small number of category-aggregates observed across three time-points and deviations from normality, the Friedman test was the more suitable method and its result was prioritised. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons specified the shape of the trajectory: the before-to-during decline ($p = 0.007$) and the during-to-after rebound ($p = 0.014$) were each individually statistically significant, whereas the before-to-after net difference was not significant. The aggregate trajectory is therefore L-shaped, a sharp deployment-epoch decline followed by a sharp post-deployment rebound consistent with a transient-guardianship mechanism rather than structural crime prevention (Braga et al., 2012; Cohen, 2010).

Category-Level Disaggregation

Table 2 summarises the phase distribution for all seven offence categories.

Table 2: Reported Crimes by Category and Deployment Phase

Category	Before (n)	During (n)	After (n)	Total	% Δ Before→During	% Δ During→After	% Δ Before→After
Crimes against the person	1,410	864	1,181	3,455	–38.72	36.68	–16.24
Property crimes	1,443	928	1,409	3,780	–35.7	51.8	–2.4
White-collar and economic crimes	17	17	21	55	0	23.53	23.53
Weapons and firearms offences	35	24	4	63	–31.4	–83.3	–88.6
Drug-related offences	0	8	1	9	Newly detected	–87.50	Newly detected

Public-order and administrative-justice offences	10	6	0	16	-40.0	-100.0	-100.0
Regulatory and statutory offences	3	61	71	135	1,933.33	16.39	2,266.67

Crimes Against the Person

This was the largest category, totalling 3,455 cases. The deployment epoch recorded a decline of 38.72 per cent (from 1,410 to 864 cases), followed by a post-withdrawal rebound of 36.68 per cent to 1,181 cases, a net reduction of 16.24 per cent. The mean number of cases dropped from 282.0 (SD = 381.41) before military arrival to 172.8 (SD = 238.40) during the operation, then climbed again to 236.2 (SD = 313.41) after withdrawal. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of epoch (Wilks' Lambda = 0.314, $F = 8.68$, $p = 0.009$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.685$), with approximately 68.5 per cent of variance attributable to the intervention epoch, an exceptionally large effect size. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons confirmed a significant reduction from before to during ($p = 0.007$) and a significant increase from during to after ($p = 0.014$); the before-to-after difference was not statistically significant. The category recovered to approximately 84 per cent of its pre-deployment total (1,181 of 1,410 cases) after withdrawal. Table 3 presents the sub-category breakdown.

Table 3: Crimes Against the Person — Sub-Category Changes by Deployment Phase

Sub-Category	Before (n)	During (n)	After (n)	% Δ Before→During	% Δ During→After	% Δ Before→After
Homicide & attempted homicide	51	19	32	-62.75	68.42	-37.25
Assault & related offences	987	617	805	-37.49	30.47	-18.44
Kidnapping & abduction	4	0	0	-100.0	0	-100.0

Robbery & armed confrontation	318	185	312	-41.82	68.65	-1.89
Sexual & psychological harm	50	43	32	-14.00	-25.58	-36.00
Category total	1,410	864	1,181	-38.72	36.68	-16.24

The strongest in-window reductions were in homicide and attempted homicide (51 → 19; -62.75 per cent during; net -37.25 per cent), robbery and armed confrontation (318 → 185; -41.82 per cent during), and assault and related offences (987 → 617; -37.49 per cent during; net -18.44 per cent). Kidnapping and abduction fell from 4 to 0 during deployment and remained at zero thereafter. Sexual and psychological harm declined 14.00 per cent during deployment and continued declining to a net -36.00 per cent. Violent crime as a whole rebounded by approximately 37 per cent after withdrawal while remaining below its pre-deployment level, confirming a rapid but incomplete rebound.

Property Crimes

Property crime totalled 3,780 cases, declining 35.7 per cent during the deployment (1,443 → 928) and rebounding 51.8 per cent post-withdrawal (to 1,409), a net change of -2.4 per cent that was statistically indistinguishable from baseline. The mean fell from 481.0 before intervention to 309.3 during, then rose again to 469.7 after; crime variability narrowed during the operation (SD = 104.2) and widened afterwards (SD = 151.1). Analysis found significant differences across all periods ($F = 29.42$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.91$), with drops during intervention and increases after deployment (both adjacent transitions $p < 0.01$); the before-to-after net change was non-significant. Table 4 presents the sub-category breakdown.

Table 4: Property Crimes Sub-Category Changes by Deployment Phase

Sub-Category	Before (n)	During (n)	After (n)	% Δ Before→During	% Δ During→After	% Δ Before→After
Theft & fraudulent acquisitions	766	501	811	-34.6	+61.9	+5.9
Burglary & break-in	502	325	483	-35.3	+48.6	-3.8

Property damage	175	102	115	−41.7	+12.7	−34.3
Category total	1,443	928	1,409	−35.7	+51.8	−2.4

Theft and fraudulent acquisitions, the largest sub-category rebounded by 61.9 per cent after withdrawal and ended 5.9 per cent above its pre-deployment baseline, indicating post-deterrence re-engagement by motivated offenders once visible guardianship was withdrawn (Cohen, 2010). Burglary and break-in declined 35.3 per cent during deployment (502 → 325), rebounded 48.6 per cent (to 483), and recorded a net −3.8 per cent; property damage declined 41.7 per cent during (175 → 102) with a modest 12.7 per cent rebound and a net −34.3 per cent.

White-Collar and Economic Crimes

White-collar and economic crimes dropped from 17 cases before intervention to 14 during the deployment, then climbed above pre-intervention levels to 21 afterwards (+23.53 per cent net; total 52 cases). Fraud increased by 200 per cent post-intervention. The statistical test revealed significant shifts across time ($F = 6.12$, $p = 0.025$, $\eta^2 = 0.604$), with post-intervention levels significantly higher than earlier periods ($p < 0.05$). While the deployment suppressed certain sub-offences, including possession of counterfeit currency and possession of suspected stolen property, the effect faded quickly, and the category is interpreted descriptively in view of its small absolute counts.

Weapons and firearms offences

This category exhibited the most sustained reduction in the dataset. Weapons offences fell 31.4 per cent during deployment (35 → 24) and a further 83.3 per cent after withdrawal (to 4), for a net before-to-after reduction of 88.6 per cent. The pointing-of-a-firearm sub-category drove the pattern (30 → 18 → 0). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA confirmed a robust intervention effect ($F = 74.26$, $p < 0.001$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.788$), with approximately 78.8 per cent of variance attributable to the deployment epoch, among the largest effect sizes documented in the comparative militarised-policing literature (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019). Bonferroni-adjusted tests showed significant reductions across all phase transitions: before-to-during ($p = 0.041$), during-to-after ($p = 0.003$), and before-to-after ($p < 0.001$). The persistence of this reduction into the post-deployment window is consistent with the physical-exposure logic of the capable-guardian mechanism: the visible presence of armed uniformed actors suppresses

the presentation of weapons, and the effect is not fully reversible on withdrawal (Cohen, 2010).

Drug-related offences.

Reported drug offences moved from a zero pre-deployment baseline to 8 cases during deployment, before collapsing to 1 case afterwards (total $n = 9$). The trajectory reflects deployment-related detection enhancement rather than a reliable measure of underlying drug-market activity; the small counts preclude robust inferential analysis.

Public-order and administration-of-justice offences

These offences totalled 16 cases, declining 40.0 per cent during deployment ($10 \rightarrow 6$) and 100.0 per cent in the post-deployment window (to 0). Sub-categories including resisting arrest ($3 \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow 0$) and obstructing or hindering police on duty ($4 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 0$) registered complete suppression, indicating a substantive behavioural-channel effect in which the visible presence of armed uniformed actors deterred obstructive conduct, with no post-deployment rebound.

Regulatory and statutory offences

This category surged from 3 cases before deployment to 61 during (+1,933.33 per cent) and 71 after (+2,266.67 per cent net), dominated by contraventions of the Liquor Act ($0 \rightarrow 38 \rightarrow 10$), COVID-19 Regulations ($0 \rightarrow 11 \rightarrow 59$), and the Emergency Act ($0 \rightarrow 10 \rightarrow 0$). The ANOVA result exceeded conventional significance thresholds ($p < 0.001$). The pattern reflects expanded enforcement scope, including COVID-era emergency regulation rather than a true surge in non-compliance, and must be interpreted separately from the victim-crime categories.

Hypothesis Test

The three pre-registered hypotheses were evaluated against the aggregate evidence. H_1 , that total reported crime declined by at least 30 per cent during deployment was verified: the deployment-epoch decline was 34.6 per cent, with a statistically significant Friedman result ($\chi^2 = 12.29$, $p = 0.002$). H_2 that the post-deployment rebound would reach at least 10 per cent above the pre-deployment baseline was verified in magnitude: the rebound reached 40.8 per cent of the deployment-window minimum, although the net before-to-after change was -7.9 per cent and statistically non-significant. H_3 that the deployment-suppression-to-rebound ratio would be below 1.0, was verified: $1,908 / 2,687 = 0.71$. The overall verdict is that the alternative hypothesis (H_1) is accepted: the deployment produced a significant,

compositionally differentiated, but temporally bounded shift in recorded crime within the observation window.

Table 5: Pre-Registered Hypothesis Verdicts

Hypothesis	Criterion	Verified Value	Verdict
H ₁ : In-window decline $\geq$ 30%	Decline in total crime during deployment	-34.6% ; Friedman $\chi^2 = 12.29$, $p = 0.002$	Accepted
H ₂ : Sustainability gap $\geq$ 10%	Post-deployment rebound	$+40.8\%$ rebound; net -7.9% (n.s.)	Verified (transient)
H ₃ : Suppression/rebound ratio < 1.0	Ratio of deployment to post-deployment totals	$1,908 / 2,687 = 0.71$	Accepted

Discussion and Conclusion

Interpretation of the Aggregate Trajectory

The joint deployment of the Namibian Defence Force with the Namibian Police Force and the Windhoek City Police in the Havana Informal Settlement produced a measurable, large, but transient decline in reported crime. Across the 64-month window, recorded incidents fell from 2,918 before the intervention to 1,908 during active deployment (-34.6 per cent), then rebounded to 2,687 after withdrawal ($+40.8$ per cent), leaving a statistically non-significant net change of -7.9 per cent. The Friedman test ($\chi^2 = 12.29$, $p = 0.002$) and the Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons ($p = 0.007$ before-to-during; $p = 0.014$ during-to-after) specify this as an L-shaped trajectory: two individually significant epoch transitions with no significant net gain (Cohen, 2010).

The pattern conforms closely to the transient-guardianship prediction of Routine Activity Theory: the deployment injected high-visibility capable guardians into the settlement, disrupting the offender–target convergence within the deployment envelope; when the guardians withdrew, the convergence resumed and reported crime migrated back toward baseline (Cohen, 2010). The comparative evidence on the militarisation of law enforcement in Latin America documents the same profile, rapid in-window suppression followed by near-complete rebound, and cautions against interpreting short-window declines as durable prevention (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019). The hot-spots policing meta-analytic literature likewise demonstrates that patrol-focused effects decay when the patrol resource is removed (Braga et al., 2012).

Category-Specific Interpretation

The category-level disaggregation qualifies the aggregate story and carries the most policy-relevant findings. First, weapons and firearms offences recorded the dataset's only sustained reduction ($35 \rightarrow 24 \rightarrow 4$; net -88.6 per cent; $F = 74.26$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.788$), declining further after withdrawal, a result consistent with the physical-exposure mechanism of visible armed guardianship and among the largest effects documented in the comparative literature (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019). Second, crimes against the person declined substantially in-window (Wilks' $\Lambda = 0.314$, $F = 8.68$, $p = 0.009$, $\eta^2 = 0.685$) but rebounded sharply, particularly robbery ($+68.65$ per cent after withdrawal) and homicide ($+68.42$ per cent). Third, property crime returned to statistical equivalence with baseline, with theft ending 5.9 per cent above its pre-deployment level, a post-deterrence overshoot signature predicted by the guardian-withdrawal mechanism (Cohen, 2010). Fourth, public-order offences were durably suppressed ($10 \rightarrow 6 \rightarrow 0$), indicating that encounter-channel resistance responds quickly and persistently to visible uniformed authority. Fifth, regulatory and statutory offences inflated through expanded enforcement ($+1,933.33$ per cent during deployment), driven by Liquor Act and COVID-19 emergency regulation, and must be interpreted as an enforcement-scope effect rather than a crime-pattern change.

Limitations

Three limitations bound these conclusions. First, the case-study scope: the findings concern a single settlement and generalise only to contexts sharing Havana's demographic and spatial profile (Attakora-Amaniampong et al., 2025; Eyita-Okon, 2022). Second, the reliance on administrative records: recorded crime reflects reporting behaviour and detection capacity as well as underlying offending, and the deployment itself altered detection intensity, most visible in the drug and regulatory categories; cross-category displacement into adjacent unpatrolled areas could not be fully measured within the settlement database (Winter et al., 2021a, 2021b). Third, the observation window: the post-deployment segment captures the immediate rebound but not the longer-term trajectory of displacement and trust, and the COVID-19 regulatory era overlaps the post-deployment window, complicating interpretation of the regulatory category.

Practical Implications and Recommendations

The practical implications are direct. For the Namibian Police Force and the Windhoek City Police, the results imply that military support should be planned as a bounded, time-limited

augmentation with a pre-committed exit strategy, and that resources should be redirected toward the civilian-policing capacity that must absorb the gains when soldiers withdraw (Osse, 2014). For the Namibian Defence Force, the sustained weapons-offence effect suggests that visible armed presence has genuine deterrent value in specific categories, but its concentration on patrol corridors and its reversal for property and person crimes indicate that patrol design should be intelligence-led and spatially tailored. For government, the L-shaped trajectory argues for a national urban-security framework in which military deployments are the exception, oversight is statutory, and civilian-institutional reform is the primary instrument of durable safety (Brooks, 2008). Procedural-justice research further indicates that the legitimacy of any repeat deployment, and hence the willingness of residents to report crime and cooperate with operations, will depend on the fairness of encounters, not only on recorded-crime outcomes (Hough et al., 2010; Reisig et al., 2007).

Directions for Further Research

Future research should extend the interrupted time-series to adjacent settlements to test displacement and diffusion; incorporate disaggregated, geocoded incident data to model micro-place concentration; and triangulate administrative statistics against perception and legitimacy measures, for which validated process-based instruments exist (Reisig et al., 2007). Multi-case comparisons across Namibian cities would establish whether the L-shaped trajectory and the weapons-offence durability generalise.

Conclusion

The administrative-statistical evidence establishes the factual baseline for the broader study: the military intervention produced a measurable, category-specific, and transient shift in reported crime in Havana, a statistically significant 34.6 per cent in-window reduction, a 40.8 per cent post-withdrawal rebound, and no significant net change of -9 per cent. The L-shaped trajectory, the durable suppression of weapons offences, and the rebound of property and person crimes are the findings against which the perception, legal-institutional, and sustainability dimensions of the wider investigation, and the policy debate on military involvement in urban crime prevention should proceed.

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