

## Research Article

### Access is True Inclusion: An Appraisal of the Theory of Accessism

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#### Abstract

This essay critiques Accessism, a structural epistemological paradigm that requires access for knowledge development and inclusion. The study draws on classical epistemology's focus on justified true belief to argue that standard theories fail to address epistemic engagement prerequisites. Accessism emphasises accessibility and exposure as prerequisites for belief development, justification, and information acquisition. The paper examines Accessism's axioms, knowledge construction dependency chain, and epistemic process formalisation using a conceptual-analytical method. Accessism has its roots in rationalism, empiricism, critical philosophy, and social epistemology, showing that it is a meta-epistemological paradigm that integrates structural and cognitive knowledge. The approach challenges the normative claim that access equals inclusion by arguing that language, technology, and institutional frameworks strongly influence epistemic involvement. This theory emphasises access as a key area of exclusion and inequality, improving epistemic injustice discourse. A critical appraisal finds conceptual clarity, transdisciplinary applicability, and educational and technological disparities

relevance. Limitations include the lack of operational measurements for access, insufficient empirical validation, and unresolved ambiguity between structural and cognitive knowledge determinants. The study found that Accessism profoundly widens epistemology by reframing knowledge within enabling contexts. It claims that inclusion is a facade without access, but equitable access promotes epistemic participation and knowledge democratisation.

**Keywords:** Access, True Inclusion, Appraisal, Accessism

## **Introduction**

Classical epistemology has debated justification, truth, and rationality in the tripartite concept of justified true belief (Gettier, 1963; Descartes, 2016; Locke, 2022). The conventional perspective of knowledge is that the cognitive subject gains it by reasoning, perception, or both. Rationalists favour innate structures and deductive reasoning; empiricists prioritise sensory experience. The identification of cognition-experience interaction in critical philosophy and modern epistemology has refined these ideas (Alican, 2022). Despite these gains, the structural conditions that determine information availability are understudied.

Classical epistemology assumes the subject has propositions, evidence, or experiences for belief growth and justification. This assumption obscures a crucial epistemological truth: one cannot evaluate, justify, or consider ideas they have not encountered. Lack of exposure prevents belief growth and justification. Epistemic engagement requires access. In situations with structural inequalities in education, language, technology, and institutional engagement, this requirement has been neglected, resulting in insufficient information.

Green and Ezenwa (2026)'s accessism is an epistemic intervention in this conceptual gap. Accessism emphasises epistemic conditions for knowledge analysis: exposure and accessibility. The thesis states that structural variables shape knowledge by limiting or allowing information. Accessibility is linguistic, cultural, institutional, and technological systems that facilitate exposure (Mazzulla & Pirrone, 2024; Fricker, 2007). Ignorance is typically created by structural inaccessibility, not intelligence or absurdity. This reconsideration impacts epistemic and social inclusivity. Inclusion traditionally means participation, representation, or physical presence in institutional or social settings. Accessism says inclusion is insufficient without knowledge access. Language barriers, poor resources, and inappropriate information can prevent learning. People or communities may be included in global knowledge systems but excluded due to technology or culture. Accessism defines inclusion as epistemic accessibility the amount to

which people are structurally empowered to encounter, comprehend, and participate with information.

This essay argues that access is true inclusion and that Accessism provides a robust theoretical foundation for this relationship. Accessism places knowledge inside a chain of structural dependencies from mediation and accessibility to exposure, belief, and justification to better explain epistemic participation. Epistemic injustice in social epistemology reveals how social structures penalise some knowers (Fricker, 2007). Accessism universalises these concepts for all knowledge and epistemic agents.

Therefore, this paper has three interrelated purposes. It carefully describes Accessism's essential ideas, axioms, and knowledge generation model. Second, it addresses Accessism's philosophical flaws and places it in epistemological traditions. Third, it explores how the normative notion that access underpinning true inclusion affects education, technology, and global knowledge equity.

This study is essential because it applies theoretical epistemology to real-world concerns. The digital divide, linguistic obstacles, and institutional exclusion affect knowledge creation and dissemination in a globalised yet unequal world (Angwaomaodoko, 2023; Morrison & Rahman, 2020). By emphasising access as an epistemic necessity, accessism enhances philosophical discourse and provides a logical and ethical framework for correcting these disparities. The study argues that epistemology must address structural truths that determine epistemic possibility, not just internal cognitive processes. Knowledge is possible with a network of enabling conditions. Neglecting these prerequisites ignores knowledge's foundation. Accessism broadens epistemology and reframes inclusion as access distribution.

### **Conceptual Foundations of Accessism**

A rigorous appraisal of Accessism requires a careful examination of its conceptual architecture, particularly its reconfiguration of key epistemological categories. While the theory does not reject the classical understanding of knowledge as justified true belief, it introduces a prior layer of analysis concerned with the conditions of epistemic possibility. In doing so, Accessism shifts the analytical focus from the internal states of the knower to the structural environment within which knowing becomes feasible. This section elucidates the core concepts underpinning the theory, namely knowledge, exposure, accessibility, and the differentiated forms of ignorance.

#### *Knowledge and Its Classical Conditions*

Accessism accepts the tripartite account of knowledge belief, truth, and justification (Gettier, 1963). This commitment establishes Accessism as an extension of classical epistemology, not a rejection. Epistemic evaluation is complicated, as shown by the Gettier dilemma, which shows that justified true belief may not be knowledge under some conditions. Accessism does not address the Gettier problem; rather, it focuses on the pre-epistemic conditions that enable belief and justification.

Traditional frameworks assume the subject has the necessary propositions or evidence for epistemic judgement. Often implicit, this assumption is rarely questioned. Accessism argues that knowledge requires prior exposure. Before forming, justifying, or assessing a belief, the subject must experience the content. This reframes epistemology to view knowledge as the culmination of a sequence that begins with access-enabled exposure, not belief.

#### *Exposure as the Origin of Epistemic Possibility*

The Accessist paradigm defines exposure as a subject's encounter with informational, conceptual, or experiential content. This contact can occur through direct perception, linguistic communication, instruction, witness, or symbolic representation (Locke, 2022; Fricker, 2007). Exposure includes mediated interactions that distinguish modern knowledge systems, not just sensory experience.

Significantly, exposure is considered required but not sufficient for knowledge. Misinformation, lack of interpretive frameworks, and failure to critically engage with content may occur (Uchihara et al., 2023). However, belief development and justification cannot begin without exposure. Thus, exposure defines epistemic potential and limits subject knowledge. This focus on exposure corrects epistemological models that concentrate internal cognitive processes. Accessism emphasises knowledge acquisition's dependent nature by emphasising subject-content interaction. A subject's knowledge depends on their cognitive capacity and exposure range and quality. Exposure opens the door to epistemic interaction, shaping knowledge.

#### *Accessibility as Structural Enablement*

Accessism views accessibility as the structural determinant of epistemic involvement, while exposure is the immediate condition. Accessibility is the structures, procedures, and situations

that allow or limit knowledge encounters (Mazzulla & Pirrone, 2024). Language, literacy, education, technology, culture, and social networks are examples.

Accessism recognises that intellect does not affect accessibility. A subject may have the intellectual capacity to understand a proposition but cannot access it due to structural constraints. Those without language, institutional, or technological access may not be able to access a scientific discovery published in a specialised journal. In such circumstances, structural exclusion causes ignorance, not cognitive inadequacy.

Accessibility emphasises the subject-informational environment relationship in epistemology. Knowledge is increasingly seen as a dynamic interaction between cognitive processes and structural factors rather than an internal achievement. Social and critical epistemology recognises the influence of social structures on epistemic outcomes (Farzanfar et al., 2023). Accessism integrates accessibility into knowledge's underlying design, expanding this idea.

### *Structural Mediation of Knowledge*

Accessibility is about structural mediation. Accessism holds that information transmission and interpretation mechanisms mediate all epistemic encounters. Language, culture, institutions, and technology mediate (Alican, 2022; Fricker, 2007). Conceptual and linguistic systems filter even direct perception, proving that knowledge is never immediate or unmediated. Many classic theories assume direct epistemic access, but this principle challenges it. Accessism shows how mediation shapes knowledge and how external variables can help or hinder understanding. The implication is that access to these mediating mechanisms often causes epistemic inequality. Without proper language, education, or technology, people and communities struggle to learn and assess.

### **Typology of Ignorance**

One of the most significant conceptual contributions of Accessism is its nuanced account of ignorance. The theory distinguishes between three forms:

1. **Cognitive Ignorance:** A failure to know despite having access and exposure.
2. **Volitional Ignorance:** A deliberate refusal to engage with available knowledge.
3. **Structural Ignorance:** A lack of knowledge resulting from insufficient access or exposure (Tanesini, 2025) .

Classical epistemology has predominantly focused on cognitive and volitional ignorance, often attributing ignorance to intellectual limitations or motivational deficiencies. Accessism, however, foregrounds structural ignorance as a pervasive and often overlooked phenomenon. This form of ignorance arises not from the failings of the individual but from the limitations of the epistemic environment.

The recognition of structural ignorance has important ethical and analytical implications. It challenges the tendency to assign blame to individuals for their lack of knowledge and instead directs attention to the systemic conditions that shape epistemic opportunities. In doing so, Accessism aligns with and extends the concept of epistemic injustice, highlighting the ways in which social and institutional structures can impede access to knowledge (Fricker, 2007) .

### *Availability and Epistemic Engagement*

A further refinement within Accessism is the distinction between the existence of knowledge and its availability. The mere presence of information within a system does not guarantee that it is accessible to all subjects. Knowledge may exist in archives, texts, or cultural practices yet remain effectively invisible to those who lack the means to access it (Currie, 2023) . This distinction underscores the importance of considering not only the production of knowledge but also its distribution and accessibility.

Availability, in this sense, becomes a prerequisite for epistemic engagement. Without it, the processes of exposure, belief formation, and justification cannot occur. This insight reinforces the central claim of Accessism that access is foundational to knowledge, and by extension, to any meaningful conception of inclusion.

### **Theoretical Architecture of Accessism**

Accessism proposes a structured explanatory model in which knowledge comes from layered enabling conditions, going beyond descriptive epistemology. The theory creates a dependency chain in which epistemic outcomes depend on structural, mediating, and experiencing elements rather than seeing knowledge as a direct link between a subject and a proposition. This section describes Accessism's architecture: axiomatic underpinnings, dependence relations, and formalised representation.

Accessism's systematisation of epistemic creation through interrelated axioms is its theoretical strength. These axioms reposition classical epistemology within a larger context. The Exposure Condition states that no epistemic state can occur without antecedent subject-informational content encounter (Locke, 2022). Exposure becomes the epistemic threshold for belief development in this circumstance.

The Accessibility Condition states that exposure depends on enabling mechanisms that regulate information availability (Mazzulla & Pirrone, 2024). Thus, accessibility determines whether epistemic content may be encountered.

The Structural Mediation Principle expands the idea that institutional, linguistic, and technical structures filter all epistemic encounters (Fricker, 2007; Alican, 2022). This principle opposes epistemic immediacy and views knowledge as constantly mediated.

The Structural Ignorance Principle states that access asymmetries rather than cognition impairments cause ignorance (Tanesini, 2025). This moves explanation from individual epistemic failure to systemic factors.

The notion of Necessity without Sufficiency explains access-related issues. Accessibility and exposure help knowledge creation, but they do not ensure truth or justification, keeping basic epistemic standards (Gettier, 1963).

These axioms form a layered paradigm in which epistemic outcomes are structurally contingent rather than cognitively decided. Accessism views knowledge formation as a sequential dependency chain enabled and constrained by previous conditions. Symbolising this chain: Accessibility → Exposure → Belief → Justification → Knowledge. Foundationally, accessibility establishes whether a subject can access informational structures. Without accessibility, epistemic encounters are impossible, nullifying subsequent steps. Critical epistemology emphasises structural circumstances shaping epistemic potential (Fricker, 2007).

In the second stage, exposure, information is encountered. Abstract availability becomes epistemic involvement through exposure. Exposure starts epistemic interaction but does not ensure comprehension or acceptance.

The third stage, belief formation, involves cognitive absorption. Based on existing knowledge, interpretive frameworks, and contextual circumstances, the subject internalises or rejects content (Locke, 2022).

In the fourth step, justification, beliefs are evaluated for epistemic validity. This stage is crucial to classical epistemology and Accessism as a normative threshold.

Only when belief, truth, and justification converge under prior access and exposure can knowledge arise.

This interdependent structure has a major theoretical impact: epistemic failure can occur at any point of the chain, although accessibility and exposure failures are generally attributed to cognitive deficits. Thus, accessism rebalances explanation across structural and cognitive knowledge creation.

To improve analytical precision, Accessism advocates formalising epistemic creation. Knowledge is based on interconnected variables:  $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{E}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{J}, \mathbf{T})$

Where:

**K** = Knowledge

**M** = Mediation structures (language, institutions, technology)

**A** = Accessibility conditions

**E** = Exposure events

**B** = Belief formation

**J** = Justification processes

**T** = Truth conditions

In this definition, knowledge is the product of interacting conditions, not a single epistemic variable. The explicit variables mediation (M) and accessibility (A) differ from classic epistemological models, which start at belief formation and ignore pre-cognitive structural factors.

Importantly, this paradigm does not entail linear determinism. Instead, it indicates a networked interaction where variables encourage or inhibit each other. High accessibility increases exposure, but poor mediation (e.g., inadequate translation or institutional framing) may diminish belief formation. Misaligned interpretive frameworks can impair reasoning even with enough exposure.

Truth (T) keeps Accessism from becoming relativism or sociological constructivism by maintaining continuity with classical epistemology. Instead, it upholds epistemic normativity and structural realism. This formalisation increases Accessism's theoretical coherence by highlighting structural factors' impact on epistemic outcomes. By showing where Accessism expands rather than replaces established models, it allows comparison with different epistemological frameworks.

## [Accessism in Dialogue with Epistemological Traditions](#)

Accessism does not emerge in isolation from established epistemological thought. Rather, it reconfigures long-standing arguments over knowledge's origin, organization, and justification. Its unique contribution is placing analytical attention on epistemic engagement conditions. This section places Accessism in rationalist, empiricist, critical, and social epistemologies before defining it as a meta-epistemology.

Classical rationalist epistemology prioritises reason as the main source of knowledge. Descartes (2016) emphasises the importance of innate notions and deductive certainty in epistemic foundations. This concept treats knowledge as a product of internal cognitive processes, with little attention paid to whether the individual has access to relevant information. A hidden assumption in rationalist cognition is the implicit availability of epistemic content to the reasoning subject. Even the most rigorous deductive methodology assumes the subject to access the premises from which conclusions are made. Rational operations cannot begin without such access. Thus, Accessism does not reject rationalism but shows its dependence on structural preconditions that conventional theories do not explain.

Rationality is important, but this critique places it within epistemic enablement. Reason uses available content, which is conditioned by accessibility structures. Locke and Hume's empiricist traditions base knowledge on sensory experience and observation (Locke, 2022; Hume, 2016). Due of its emphasis on worldly experience, Empiricism looks to align more with Accessism.

Accessism challenges the idea that sensory perception is universal or unmediated. In modern knowledge systems, experience is indirect, technologically aided, and institutionalised. Mediating frameworks including digital platforms, scientific apparatus, and language interpretation systems change what subjects “observe” (Mazzulla & Pirrone, 2024). The structural complexity of exposure is underestimated by empiricism. Experience is created, filtered, and shared. Thus, accessism reframes empiricism by suggesting that sensory involvement requires accessibility and mediation. Experience becomes structurally dependent from a foundational epistemic primitive.

Kantian critical philosophy argues that cognition shapes knowledge, which changes epistemology (Kant, 1998). Critical theory highlights the subject's active participation in structuring experience through categories of knowledge.

Accessism and critical philosophy both involve structuration, but accessism places it outside the cognitive subject. Kantian epistemic conditions are in the transcendental subject, while Accessism places them in mediation and access mechanisms (Alican, 2022). This distinction matters. Accessionism does not deny cognitive structuring; it contends that cognitive structures simply need external systems. Critical philosophy internalises knowledge conditions, while Accessism emphasises the socio-structural settings that shape knowledge. Contemporary social epistemology, especially epistemic injustice, is the closest precursor to Accessism. Fricker (2007) shows how social power relations can mislead credibility evaluations and marginalise some knowers in epistemic practises.

Generalising this concept beyond testimonial injustice and hermeneutical marginalisation is accessism. It claims that epistemic injustice is rooted in unequal access to knowledge, not incorrect evaluation. Exclusion happens before interpretive or evaluative unfairness at the exposure and accessibility level.

Accessism also shows that injustice is inherent in infrastructural systems like education, technology, and language dissemination. This expansion addresses global knowledge asymmetries and digital inequality (Angwaomaodoko, 2023; Morrison & Rahman, 2020). Thus, whereas social epistemology diagnoses epistemic inequality, Accessism explains its structural roots in access conditions.

Accessism is a meta-epistemological theory that engages with key epistemological traditions. It integrates rationalism, empiricism, and critical philosophy into a structural model of epistemic possibility rather than competing with them. As meta-epistemology, Accessism serves three purposes. It begins with preconditions that underlie all epistemic systems, regardless of internal convictions. Second, it unites cognitive and structural knowledge into an explanatory model. Third, it provides a normative framework for assessing epistemic inclusion across settings.

Accessism is a critical framework and analytical instrument. It explains how information is possible and questions its fair availability. The theory challenges epistemology to explain how knowledge is justified and how it is feasible by redefining access.

## **Access as True Inclusion: The Normative Claim**

Accessism's redefinition of inclusion shows its normative power. Inclusion in social and educational theory typically emphasises institutional involvement, representation, or formal presence. Accessism argues that such inclusion is epistemically deficient without substantive knowledge access. This makes inclusivity epistemological, not spatial or institutional. Accessism emphasises epistemic engagement over physical or symbolic presence. On this view, inclusion is being usefully positioned within an institution or system's knowledge flows, not just being present. This requires encountering, interpreting, and engaging with important information. Epistemic participation requires people to be present in knowledge-producing contexts and structurally enabled to access and process their knowledge. Lack of access makes inclusion performative. Language, pedagogical, or technological hurdles may prevent a student from accessing instructional resources (Mazzulla & Pirrone, 2024).

Accessism requires that inclusion be assessed by how much people are in accessible epistemic networks. The reframe challenges policy frameworks that equate inclusion with enrolment or representation alone. Epistemic exclusion is typically structurally induced, according to Accessism. Education, language, technology, and institutional design inequalities determine who can access knowledge and how.

The digital gap continues to create information access disparities, especially in areas with uneven technology infrastructure (Angwaomaodoko, 2023). Linguistic hierarchies also exclude non-dominant societies from epistemic participation by favouring certain languages as knowledge carriers. Structured ignorance, according to Accessism, is caused by constrained access conditions rather than cognitive limitations (Tanesini, 2025).

In this view, marginalisation is cognitive as much as social or economic. Individuals and groups may be formally included in global knowledge production systems yet excluded from meaningful interaction. This paradox shows that inclusion approaches without epistemic accessibility are inadequate. Redefining inclusion as access has ethical concerns. If knowledge requires access, then epistemic justice requires equitable access. Thus, institutions must produce and make knowledge accessible.

This role spans education, government, and technological design. Educational institutions must make teaching resources accessible across linguistic and cognitive differences ethically. Digital platforms that spread knowledge have ethical responsibility to reduce structural barriers to epistemic involvement.

Epistemic justice theory recognises that structural factors might hinder knowledge participation (Fricker, 2007). These requirements coincide with this. Accessism expands this ethical paradigm by claiming that such commitments are essential to any just epistemic system. Access ethically requires empowerment as well as equitable distribution. Access gives people epistemic agency to critically engage with, challenge, and contribute to knowledge systems. Accessism views inclusivity as structural empowerment beyond ethical obligation. Access to knowledge allows people to enlarge their epistemic boundaries and construct knowledge. Education's structured exposure system is crucial to this process. Education shapes learners' epistemic experiences through curriculum, pedagogy, and institutions. Education may greatly increase access and epistemic engagement when planned inclusively.

Technology also facilitates inclusivity. Digital infrastructures can lower information barriers and increase knowledge system involvement when developed fairly. When unevenly dispersed or poorly built, they may aggravate access inequities. Thus, structural empowerment requires educational, technical, and institutional mechanisms to increase epistemic accessibility. The accessist view this alignment as necessary for true inclusion.

### [Critical Appraisal of Accessism](#)

Accessism must be critically assessed for internal coherence, explanatory scope, and philosophical implications beyond presentation. The theory gives a persuasive structural reorientation of epistemology, although it has reductionism, conceptual clarity, and framework linkage issues. This section assesses its theoretical merits, key weaknesses, and solveability. Accessism's conceptual clarity and formalisation are excellent. By distinguishing accessibility, exposure, belief, justification, and truth, the theory organises and connects knowledge. Unlike traditional epistemological frameworks, which leave knowledge preconditions implicit, this clarity is significant.

Integration across epistemic traditions is another strength. Rationalism, empiricism, and critical philosophy are unified by accessism. Rationalist reasoning requires proposition access, empiricist observation involves mediated exposure, and critical philosophy is placed within external information distribution systems (Descartes, 2016; Locke, 2022; Alican, 2022). Third, accessibility is practical. It addresses structural knowledge barriers in education, technology, and global inequity. It addresses the digital gap, language marginalisation, and institutional barriers (Angwaomaodoko, 2023; Morrison & Rahman, 2020). This applied dimension makes it theoretically meaningful beyond abstract theory.

Ultimately, the theory analyses and morally rethinks ignorance. Accessism distinguishes structural ignorance from cognitive and volitional ignorance and emphasises systemic elements to challenge deficit-based explanations of knowledge inequality (Tanesini, 2025). This alters epistemic blame and accountability.

Accessivism influences modern epistemology. It first moves epistemological examination from internal justification to external enablers. Today's epistemology considers infrastructure, institutions, and technology. It describes ignorance as structural, not cognitive or volitional. This explains epistemic failure as access disparity rather than individual flaws. Third, accessism brings ethics and politics into epistemology. Access to inclusion ties epistemology to justice, responsibility, and social order. Knowledge theory and normative social theory, notably epistemic justice, are strengthened (Fricker, 2007).

*Accessism* some limitations.

First, “access is necessary for knowledge” is too obvious to constitute a substantial theoretical development, according to the triviality objection. All epistemological theories imply access, hence accessism may be a restatement. This issue minimises the theory's ability to integrate access into knowledge formation's explanation.

A reduction to sociology criticism claims Accessism overemphasises structural factors and collapses epistemology into social theory. If access structures explain knowledge, sociological description may replace epistemic normativity, critics say. The paradigm may consider truth and justification separately epistemically.

Third, rationalists dispute innate knowledge. Access seems unneeded if knowledge is innate or a priori (Descartes, 2016). Accessism must justify knowledge claims without empirical evidence.

Fourth, endless access regress. Exposure and belief require access; what conditions limit it? Explanatory regress may result from access without a clear terminus like structural systems or material situations.

Finally, Accessism may overemphasise extrinsic circumstances and devalue cognitive agency. If access structures greatly affect epistemic outcomes, knower autonomy may decrease. Accessism can solve these issues in many ways. Theory's value in triviality is systematic integration and explanatory restructuring, not novelty. Clear frameworks that indicate cross-domain repercussions are needed to make many philosophical conclusions meaningful. Sociologically, Accessism distinguishes structural enablement from epistemic normativity.

Access factors affect epistemic possibility, but truth and justification differ. The theory combines sociology into epistemology, not vice versa.

Comparing cognitive capacity and epistemic activation lets Accessism accept limited a priori cognition. Innate understanding structures need exposure to activate.

Avoid regress by viewing accessibility as based on material and institutional infrastructures, not epistemic circumstances. Anchoring reliance prevents endless loops in language, education, and technology. Accessism limits cognitive agency, reducing concerns. Accessibility determines agents' epistemic opportunities. Despite major issues, Accessism's core remains intact. They advise improving structure-agency interactions.

### **Limitations and Gaps in Accessism**

Accessism is a new paradigm with restrictions despite its moral ambition and theoretical clarity. Gaps indicate theoretical growth, empirical grounding, and transdisciplinary engagement, not invalidation. Critical evaluation must separate conceptual innovation from measurement, demarcation, and epistemic applicability gaps. The empirical base of accessism is lacking. The theory provides a good notion of knowledge production, however it lacks empirical evidence. Well-theorized but unquantified are exposure, accessibility, and structural ignorance. Despite education, technology, and language differences, accessism does not assess epistemic access across environments. That restricts comparative empirical study and policy evaluation. The proportional weight of structural and cognitive elements in epistemic errors is difficult to determine without empirical calibration. Accessism can be predictive or normative. Access metrics are insufficient due to empirical restrictions. Accessionism argues knowledge depends on accessibility, but it doesn't distinguish operational levels or access types. Dimensional access might vary qualitatively. Understanding and accessibility of language Digital infrastructure tech access Educational inclusiveness improves with institutional accessibility.

Interpretive frameworks are cognitively accessible. Theory implies these distinctions (Mazzulla & Pirrone, 2024; Farzanfar et al., 2023) but does not measure them. So, the theory risks conceptual breadth without analytical precision.

This applies notably to policy applications that require quantified inclusion and exclusion. Accessism in governance or institutional reform is difficult without metrics. Access-cognition boundaries are another issue. Accessism separates cognitive processes (belief development and reasoning) from structural considerations. These places may be closer than

thought.

Cognitive interpretation impacts access. A subject may know but not interpret. This obscures cognitive and structural barriers. Philosophically, is access external or partially cognitive? Accessism may require a more holistic epistemic interaction account than structural–cognitive dichotomy.

Epistemology, social theory, and education influence accessivism. Lacks transdisciplinary implementation. Methodological progress is needed to apply its theories to education policy, digital governance, and sociolinguistics.

The theory suggests curriculum design should boost school visibility and accessibility. How to quantify epistemic access-related educational efficacy is not specified. Accessism prioritises digital infrastructure but not knowledge distribution platform design equity.

Diagnostic critique rather than implementation strategy without operational settings is risky. Another drawback is normative universality. Inclusion in all epistemic settings demands access, says accessivism. Epistemic systems vary by culture, institution, and time. Accessism may compensate for knowledge context variance. Not all accessible infrastructure architectural models work for oral traditions, informal learning, or non-institutional epistemic systems. Accessism must embrace different epistemic cultures without restricting them to a single structural template to be universal.

Finally, structural overgeneralisation is methodologically flawed. Access as a basic explanation risks overemphasising structural difficulties over motivation, ingenuity, and epistemic virtue. The theory respects cognitive agency, but imbalanced explanation may cause structural determinism. This tension emphasises the necessity to understand how structural constraints dynamically change epistemic dispositions.

This constraint shows Accessism's theoretical growth, not decline. Empirical operationalisation, metric innovation, and multidisciplinary integration are study alternatives.

### **Implications for Research, Policy, and Practice**

The consequences for practical disciplines elevate Accessism's theoretical framework. Redefining knowledge as access stretches the paradigm beyond epistemological abstraction into education, technology, cultural interaction, and policy design. Its normative orientation helps resolve knowledge production and distribution disparities. Accessism views education as organised epistemic exposure, not content. Traditional pedagogy attributes learning results to

cognitive ability, motivation, or teaching. Accessism counters this by prioritising accessibility over learning.

Curriculum design expands epistemology. This entails exposing pupils to topics and providing accessible knowledge frameworks that encourage meaningful participation. Language complexity, cultural relevance, and representational inclusivity are pedagogical concerns. As Accessism shows, educational injustice is often caused by unequal epistemic access, not talent or effort. Focusing evaluation from learner deficit to structural design. Thus, educational reform must reduce language marginalisation, limited teaching resources, and uneven institutional support (Mazzulla & Pirrone, 2024). Technological infrastructures mediate knowledge access in modern communities, promoting accessism. Epistemic exposure is largely through digital platforms, search engines, and online education.

Accessism shows that knowledge availability does not guarantee accessibility, despite technological advances. Knowledge access is still affected by digital divisions, algorithmic screening, and infrastructure inequality (Angwaomaodoko, 2023). Policymakers must evaluate technological progress for innovation and epistemic equity. Access-based criteria include broadband distribution, device cost, platform usability, and digital language inclusivity. Additionally, algorithmic information flow curators create new mediated access. These systems can increase epistemic exposure or structural ignorance depending on design. Accessism presents a normative framework for assessing technology systems' epistemic inclusivity. Translation, linguistic variation, and knowledge interchange are affected by accessism in cross-cultural epistemology. Which communities obtain epistemic content depends on language (Ihejirika, 2024).

Language hierarchies that promote dominant languages in academic, scientific, and institutional communication unevenly distribute knowledge in multilingual circumstances. Accessism sees this as a structural barrier to epistemic involvement, not a neutral part of global communication. This framework considers translation as epistemic mediation that expands access beyond language conversion. To share information across cultures and languages, epistemic inclusion requires competent translation.

This viewpoint challenges knowledge system universality. It claims selective accessibility shapes “global knowledge” rather than universal epistemic reach. Accessism and epistemic justice policies, particularly structural knowledge participation inequities, coincide (Fricker, 2007).

Making structural accessibility a policy priority instead of evaluative fairness exacerbates these challenges.

Accessist policies prioritise: Fair distribution of educational infrastructure • Institutional inclusive language policies • Digital connectivity and access investment • Removing institutional information barriers Supporting marginalised knowledge systems

Epistemological and infrastructural justice are linked. A knowledge system is fair if people can meaningfully use its epistemic resources, not merely how they are treated. Policy design prevents accessism. It prioritises system design to reduce epistemic exclusion rather than addressing it later. Accessism has various research avenues. First, it emphasises exposure, mediation efficiency, and structural barriers as empirical epistemic access measurements. Such methodologies enable educational, technical, and cultural comparisons. Second, philosophy, education, information science, and sociology can operationalise access-based knowledge distribution models. Third, uneven global information flows generate epistemic and social injustice issues. Accessism's final suggestion is to shift epistemological research from defending knowledge to assessing feasibility.

## **Conclusion**

Accessism, a structural epistemology reorientation, emphasises access as a foundation for knowledge development and inclusiveness. By focusing on external enabling factors rather than internal cognitive justification, the framework departs from standard epistemological models in its conceptual, analytical, normative, and applied dimensions. Accessism holds that knowledge is the result of an organised sequence in which accessibility and exposure are preconditions for epistemic involvement. This reconfiguration undermines classical epistemology's implicit assumption that subjects always have relevant epistemic content. It shows that linguistic, technical, institutional, and cultural infrastructures unfairly distribute epistemic potential.

The research shows that Accessism provides a consistent dependence model in which accessibility precedes exposure, exposure enables belief, and belief is justified to provide knowledge. This structural link shows that epistemic failure can occur before cognitive evaluation, which is commonly neglected. Thus, the idea reframes ignorance as often structural rather than cognitive or volitional.

Accessism asserts that true inclusion is epistemic inclusion, which is a function of access. This position places inclusion in meaningful epistemic engagement rather than physical presence or

formal participation. Regardless of institutional representation or formal equality, inclusion is symbolic without access.

The consequences of this claim are huge. In education, it shifts focus toward curriculum accessibility and exposure design. The epistemic effects of digital infrastructure and algorithmic mediation are shown in technology. It shows linguistic and institutional inequities that limit knowledge generation in global knowledge systems.

Accessism expands classical epistemology, not replaces it. Truth and justification remain normative despite being embedded in a structural account of epistemic possibility. Thus, it expands epistemological traditions rather than rejecting them. However, the theory is evolving. The lack of completely operationalised access indicators, the necessity for empirical validation, and the difficulty of integrating cognitive and structural characteristics suggest possibilities for improvement. These shortcomings do not undermine its philosophical contribution but suggest further research that may improve its explanatory and practical effectiveness.

Accessism rethinks knowledge and epistemic inclusion in a significant way. It claims that knowledge cannot be fully comprehended without considering its origins. It redefines epistemology as a theory of access and justification. Without access, inclusion is illusory; with access, epistemic engagement is possible and knowledge is democratised.

## **Recommendations**

1. Drawing from the theoretical insights and critical appraisal of Accessism, the following recommendations are advanced to strengthen its scholarly development and enhance its practical applicability across education, technology, and policy environments.
2. There is a need to translate the conceptual categories of Accessism into measurable indicators. Future research should develop validated frameworks for assessing degrees of accessibility across linguistic, technological, institutional, and educational domains
3. Accessism would benefit from systematic empirical testing across diverse socio-educational contexts. Comparative studies across regions, particularly between high-access and low-access environments, could help determine the explanatory strength of access as a predictor of epistemic inequality. This would also clarify the relative influence of structural versus cognitive factors in knowledge acquisition.
4. Educational systems should incorporate access-based design principles into curriculum development. This includes simplifying linguistic complexity where appropriate,

expanding multimodal learning resources, and ensuring culturally inclusive content design.

5. Given the centrality of technology in mediating access, regulatory frameworks should be developed to ensure equitable digital participation. This includes addressing algorithmic bias, improving infrastructure distribution, and enforcing transparency in knowledge curation systems.

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